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PROTECTING PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS IN FEDERAL
CAPITAL TRIALS:
UNITED STATES V. TSARNAEV
ASHLEY DABIERE*

INTRODUCTION
On April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded near the finish line of the
Boston Marathon, killing three innocent victims and injuring
hundreds.1 Even Bostonians not directly impacted by the bombing
were left traumatized.2 Following the tragedy, sales of t-shirts reading
“Boston Strong” soared,3 and the community came together with a
common desire to bring the perpetrators to justice.4 Bostonians
celebrated when then-teenager and alleged bomber Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev (“Dzhokhar”) was captured.5
The media reported
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1. Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Mar. 23, 2021, 9:57 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/index.html.
2. See E. Alison Holman et al., Media’s role in broadcasting acute stress following the
Boston Marathon bombings, 111 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 93, 96–97
(2014) (finding those who were only indirectly exposed to the bombings through repeated media
coverage were more strongly associated with reports of acute stress than those who were directly
exposed by being present).
3. Steve Annear, Emerson Students That Coined ‘Boston Strong’ Phrase Organizing Giant
(Jun.
10,
2013,
12:12
PM),
Photo
Shoot
at
Copley,
BOS. MAGAZINE.
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2013/06/10/emerson-students-boston-strong-tshirts/.
4. See U.S. v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting comments made on the
social media pages of one of the jurors, in which one commenter described the juror’s opportunity
to hear the case as “awesome” and another encouraged the juror to “send him to jail where he
will be taken care of”).
5. Id. at 51 (describing the tweet posted by another juror as celebrating with the city of
Boston when Dzhokhar was captured); Zachary T. Sampson & Jaclyn Reiss, Cheers and jubilation
follow apprehension of second suspect, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 20, 2013, 1:03 AM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/20/boston-watertown-erupt-with-cheers-reliefafter-capture-terror-suspect/O3MjKHppLKUH6fqOioha3M/story.html.
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extensively on the tragedy.6 Despite such extensive media coverage and
community trauma, Dzhokhar’s capital trial was conducted in the heart
of Boston. His defense team argued jurors selected were from the same
pool of people emotionally affected by the tragedy.7 Moreover, these
jurors did not receive a complete picture of the events leading up to the
crime.8
The following Commentary considers the constitutionality of (1)
the trial court’s exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence during the
trial’s penalty phase and (2) the imposition of a death sentence by the
Supreme Court during a moratorium on federal executions. In the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the jury
ultimately convicted Dzhokhar of thirty counts and recommended
death sentences for six of the capital offenses.9 On appeal, the First
Circuit vacated these death sentences and remanded the case for a new
sentencing hearing with a different jury.10 First, the Court of Appeals
held that the voir dire used to seat the jury was insufficient.11 Second,
and particularly relevant here, the Court of Appeals held that the
district court erred by excluding reliable mitigating evidence from the
sentencing phase of Dzhokhar’s trial.12 The excluded evidence was
specifically directed at a set of prior murders allegedly committed for
jihadist purposes by Dzhokhar’s older, influential brother and coperpetrator in the bombings.13 Under the Trump Administration, the
federal government appealed the First Circuit’s vacatur.14 The case was
granted certiorari in March of 2021, following President Biden’s

6. See Holman, supra note 2, at 95 (finding some study participants from the area watched
coverage of the marathon bombings for at least six hours a day during the week after the
bombings).
7. Katharine Q. Seelye, Change of Venue Denied for Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect,
N.Y TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/us/change-of-venue-denied-forboston-marathon-bombing-suspect.html.
8. See Brief of Respondent at 1–2, No. 20-443 (filed Aug. 20, 2021) (arguing that the court’s
exclusion from evidence about the defendant’s violent older brother left the jury with an
incomplete picture of the defendant’s culpability).
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (filed Oct. 6, 2020).
10. Id. at 11.
11. See id. (“[T]he Court of Appeals deemed the district court to have abused its discretion
by denying respondent’s requests for additional specific questions about the jurors’ pretrial media
exposure.”).
12. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 11.
13. Id.
14. Amy Howe, Justices will decide whether to reinstate death penalty for Boston Marathon
bomber, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/justiceswill-decide-whether-to-reinstate-death-penalty-for-boston-marathon-bomber/.
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inauguration.15
During the October 2021 term, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments from Dzhokhar’s counsel and the federal government on
both issues decided by the First Circuit.16 The Court’s ruling will likely
determine how much deference is given to the decisions of federal trial
courts on issues directly linked to the fairness of procedures used in
federal capital trials.17 More narrowly, the Court’s decision will guide
future appellate courts in determining how much deference to give trial
court decisions related to the introduction of mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial.18 The Court should ensure
procedural safeguards are consistently followed to wholly protect the
constitutional rights afforded to capital defendants, regardless of the
atrocities committed. When the potential punishment is of the utmost
severity and places a defendant’s life on the line, such safeguards are
indispensable in order to maintain consistency with the Constitution.
I. FACTS
Dzhokhar is of Chechen descent and emigrated to the United
States at the age of eight in 2002.19 During his childhood, Dzhokhar
admired his older brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev (“Tamerlan”).20 He
often agreed to go along with Tamerlan’s plans, as is custom for a
younger brother in Chechen culture.21 For a time, neither brother held
any radicalized political or religious beliefs.22 In 2011, however, just as
Dzhokhar was finishing high school, Tamerlan began delving into the
world of Islamic extremism.23
In 2011, on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Tamerlan’s
close friends were found robbed and murdered in a Waltham

15. Id.
16. The Supreme Court will likely reach a decision on the case by the summer of 2022. Date
Set for Supreme Court to Hear Boston Marathon Bomber Death Penalty Case, NBC BOS. (Jul. 14,
2021, 2:18 AM), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/date-set-for-supreme-court-to-hearboston-marathon-bomber-death-penalty-case/2428758/.
17. U.S. Supreme Court to Review Federal Appeals Court Decision that Overturned Death
Sentence in Boston Marathon Bombing, DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR. (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/u-s-supreme-court-to-review-federal-appeals-court-decisionthat-overturned-death-sentence-in-boston-marathon-bombing.
18. Id.
19. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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apartment.24 Dzhokhar later told his friend that Tamerlan had
committed jihad through his involvement in the killings.25 Tamerlan’s
computer contained files stating that nonbelievers could be robbed to
support jihad.26 Tamerlan’s friend, Ibragim Todashev (“Todashev”),
later admitted to investigators that Tamerlan had slit the throats of the
Waltham victims. During his confession, however, Todashev attempted
to attack the investigators and was killed.27
In early 2012, Tamerlan visited Russia for several months to join a
violent jihadi group.28 Before he left and throughout his visit, Tamerlan
distributed extremist propaganda to Dzhokhar, attempting to
radicalize him.29 Upon Tamerlan’s return to the United States later that
year, Dzhokhar visited him during a college break, and the pair viewed
bomb-making instructions in an Al Qaeda magazine.30 It was at this
point that Dzhokhar told a friend he wanted to “bring justice for [his]
people.”31
The Boston Marathon bombings occurred on April 15, 2013, when
the Tsarnaev brothers detonated two bombs at the finish line.32 Two
adults and a child were violently killed as their loved ones held them.33
Hundreds of others lost limbs or were embedded with shrapnel,
resulting in injuries that would disable them for the rest of their lives.34
The brothers left the scene, nonchalantly stopping at a grocery store on
their way.35 Dzhokhar returned to college and continued his normal
routine the following day.36
On April 18, the FBI released images of the brothers and turned to
the public to find them.37 That night, the brothers loaded Tamerlan’s car
with bombs and a handgun and left his home in Cambridge.38 Soon
after, the brothers shot and killed a campus police officer at the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id.
Id.
U.S. v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2020).
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology and drove to another suburb
where they hijacked a car.39 Authorities were able to track the location
of the hijacked car, eventually leading to a shootout between the
brothers and police officers.40 Dzhokar drove over his brother while
attempting to flee the scene, resulting in Tamerlan’s death hours later.41
On April 19, a homeowner found Dzhokhar hiding inside his stored
boat.42 Authorities were called and arrested Dzhokhar.43 Inside the
boat, Dzhokhar had carved a manifesto, explaining his actions as
revenge for the killing of Muslims by the United States government.44
From the time of the bombings and throughout the aftermath of
Dzhokhar’s capture, the tragedy received widespread publicity from
the press and social media platforms.45 Images of the aftermath and
statements from family members of victims and public officials calling
for the execution of the perpetrators were prevalent.46 When Dzhokhar
was apprehended, Bostonians united in solidarity.47 The slogan “Boston
Strong” was adopted and used to fundraise for the victims.48
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Boston federal grand jury indicted Dzhokhar on thirty counts,
including charges for murder, using a weapon of mass destruction,
conspiracy, and possession and use of a firearm.49 Seventeen of the
counts were death-eligible, and the government informed Dzhokhar
they would seek the death penalty for each count.50 Due to the pretrial
publicity surrounding the case, especially in the Boston area, Dzhokhar
moved for a change in venue for the guilt phase of the trial.51 The judge
denied the motion.52
In exchange for denying Dzhokhar’s motion for a change in venue,
39. Id.
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 7.
46. Id.
47. See Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 110 (Torruella, J., concurring) (discussing the purpose of the
slogan “Boston Strong” and quoting the Boston Police Commissioner as telling Congress the
terrorist attack caused Boston “to band together as a city . . . in a time of crisis”).
48. Id. at 111.
49. Id. at 39 n.9 (listing all charges from the 30-count indictment).
50. Id. at 40.
51. Id. at 41.
52. Id.
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the trial judge attempted to conduct an extensive voir dire to screen
jurors for any preexisting biases.53 Initially, both parties encouraged the
district court to ask jurors content-specific questions about the
publicity or events they had seen, heard, read, or experienced.54 The
government, however, later opposed such questions.55 During the first
screening of the voir dire, a questionnaire was presented to potential
jurors that asked about the amount of coverage of the bombings they
had viewed, and whether that coverage had led them to form an
opinion about Dzhokhar’s guilt or the punishment he should receive.56
In the second round, the court followed up on the answers jurors had
given to the questionnaire.57 Specifically, Dzhokhar’s counsel asked the
court to inquire into what each juror had heard, read, or seen about the
bombing and the subsequent events.58 The court declined this request,
stating that answers to these content-specific questions that were
separate from those asked in the questionnaire would lead to
inefficiency and be unreliable.59 By the end of the voir dire, twelve
jurors were seated who had confirmed that they had not paid much
attention to the pretrial publicity and would be able to set aside any
personal biases or prior views.60 The court, however, was still unaware
of the specific content that nine of the jurors had seen.61 The jurors
eventually convicted Dzhokhar on all counts, despite arguments by his
counsel to show that his radicalization stemmed from his brother.62
The same jury convened for the penalty phase of the trial.63 To
establish a theory of mitigation, Dzhokhar’s counsel argued that he had
only committed the crimes because of his older brother’s influence.64
The key to this argument was to show Tamerlan’s involvement and lead
role in the Waltham murders.65 To discover potential admissible

53. Id.
54. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 7.
55. Id. at 8.
56. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 9, at 7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7–8.
60. Id. at 8
61. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 8.
62. U.S. v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2020).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 66.
65. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 19 (“The Waltham evidence was highly
probative of Dzhokhar’s lesser culpability.”). See also discussion infra Part IV.A.1 (summarizing
Dzhokhar’s basis for his argument at the trial court).
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evidence of Tamerlan’s unescapable influence, Dzhokhar’s counsel
requested that the court make available all reports that contained
statements from Todashev on the Waltham murders.66 The government
opposed this request, citing Brady v. Maryland67 and arguing that the
requested materials were non-discoverable.68
Ultimately, the court agreed with the government, finding it
sufficient that the government generally disclosed the content of
Todashev’s statement.69 This decision, however, prevented Dzhokhar’s
counsel from learning details about the Waltham crimes which, as
disclosed by Todashev, revealed that Tamerlan took the lead in the
murders.70 Additionally, the court granted the government’s motion inlimine to bar Dzhokhar’s counsel from presenting any evidence of the
Waltham murders in general.71 From its own review of the evidence
disclosed by investigators, the court concluded that it did not show for
certain that Tamerlan was the key actor in the crimes, and that its
introduction may “be confusing to the jury . . . without [having] any
probative value.”72
Despite efforts by the defense to show that Tamerlan’s influence
was key to Dzhokhar’s criminal conduct, the mitigation theory was
greatly weakened by the trial court’s decision to exclude the Waltham
evidence.73 Contrarily, the government succeeded in arguing Tamerlan
and Dzhokhar were equally culpable.74 Using the weakened mitigation
evidence presented, the government successfully argued that the
defense only showed that Tamerlan was “bossy” and did not prove that
Tamerlan “coerced or controlled” Dzhokhar.75 The jury recommended
the death penalty for six of the death-eligible counts, which the judge

66. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 64.
67. 373 U.S. 83, 89 (1963) (holding that the government is only required to disclose evidence
from a criminal investigation if such information is material to a defendant’s punishment).
68. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 64–65.
69. Id. at 65.
70. See id. (describing aspects of Todashev’s disclosure that showed Tamerlan had a
coercive influence over those that interacted with him and lead role in the Waltham murders,
including that Tamerlan bought the tools for the crime, Tamerlan instructed Todashev to duct
tape one of the victims, Tamerlan made the decision to kill the men despite Todashev only
agreeing to robbing them, and Talerman slashed the victim’s throats).
71. Id. at 66.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 66–67 (reducing the argument made by Dzhokhar’s counsel to mere examples
of Tamerlan occasionally breaking minor rules, being slightly and occasionally argumentative,
and, at worst, possibly being physically abusive to his girlfriend who later married him).
74. Id. at 67.
75. Id.
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formally imposed alongside several life terms for the remaining
counts.76 Consequently, Dzhokhar appealed to the First Circuit.77
The Court of Appeals affirmed several of Dzhokhar’s convictions,
but vacated the imposed death sentences on two grounds and
remanded the case for a rehearing on the sentencing proceedings with
a new jury.78 First, the Court of Appeals relied on Patriarca v. United
States79 to hold that district court judges were required to “elicit ‘the
kind and degree’ of each prospective juror’s ‘exposure to the case or
the parties,’ if asked by counsel.”80 Using this standard, the court
concluded that the district court abused its discretion in the voir dire
when it denied defense counsel’s requests to ask content-specific
questions about the publicity jurors had seen.81 In reaching this
conclusion, the First Circuit recognized that the court failed to consider
content-specific questions about pretrial publicity to be
constitutionally required during voir dire.82 Nevertheless, the circuit
court found that lack of a constitutional requirement does not prevent
a federal appellate court from using its supervisory powers to be more
involved in setting the standards for the voir dire used by federal trial
courts.83 Resultingly, in regard to the sentencing phase of Dzhokhar’s
trial, the circuit court found that the government did not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s denial to ask content-specific
questions was harmless.84
Second, the Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its
discretion when it barred Dzhokhar’s counsel from presenting
mitigating evidence from the Waltham murders during the penalty
phase.85 Unlike the district court, the First Circuit concluded that
evidence from the Waltham murders was “highly probative of
Tamerlan’s ability to influence Dzhokhar.”86 In reaching this

76. Id. at 42.
77. Id.
78. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 9, at 2. Consequently, the First Circuit found it did
not need to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion by deciding that the venue in
Boston was proper. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 56.
79. 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1969).
80. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 35 (quoting Patriarca, 402 F.2d at 318).
81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 60 (citing Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 62.
85. Id. at 73.
86. Id. at 69.
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conclusion, the circuit court determined that the Waltham murders
showed Tamerlan’s ability to commit brutal acts, that he was able and
willing to commit jihad without Dzhokhar’s help, and that at least one
juror could have found Dzhokhar did not merely find Tamerlan
“bossy” but feared what he would do to him if he did not help with the
bombings.87 Thus, the Court of Appeals rejected the government’s
contentions that the evidence was not relevant.88
The government filed its petition for writ of certiorari in October
2020. On March 22, 2021, the Petition was granted.89
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Requirements Embedded in the Federal Death
Penalty Act
During the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the Court has long
affirmed that the Eighth Amendment allows defendants to present a
wide range of mitigating factors that would be relevant in support of a
sentence less than death, including “any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.”90 This
rule encompasses a defendant’s constitutional right to argue that they
were less culpable than other actors who joined in committing the
crime.91 The Court has also held that a statute, or a court’s
interpretation of a statute, cannot prevent a jury “from giving
meaningful effect to mitigating evidence that may justify the imposition
of a life sentence rather than a death sentence.”92 Consequently, the
sentencing jury is required, and therefore must be allowed by a trial
court, to consider, “as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence,”93 if such evidence would logically and reasonably allow a
juror to determine that a sentence less than death is warranted.94 Once
evidence has been deemed relevant, it need only be shown to have a

87. Id.
88. Id. at 70.
89. U.S. Supreme Court to Review Federal Appeals Court Decision that Overturned Death
Sentence in Boston Marathon Bombing, supra note 14.
90. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
91. See id. at 608 (holding a state statute was unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment, because it did not allow a defendant to argue as a mitigating factor her relatively
minor role in the crime).
92. Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007).
93. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (emphasis in original).
94. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–85 (2004).
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“minimal indicia of reliability” to be admitted during sentencing.95
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (“FDPA”) attempts to
implement a defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights through two
critical provisions that apply to the scope of evidence admissible during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. First, the FDPA requires the jury
to “consider any mitigating factor,” and provides an inclusive list of
several factors that may be introduced by a defendant.96 Importantly,
this provision explicitly allows a defendant to introduce evidence
showing “[m]inor participation” relative to the conduct of another who
committed the crime.97
Second, the FDPA implements a balancing test that trial courts can
use to exclude evidence to the jury during the sentencing phase.98 In
the case of introducing mitigating evidence, the FDPA contemplates
that “any information relevant to a mitigating factor” can be presented,
regardless of whether that piece of information would be admissible
under the standard rules of evidence.99 Nonetheless, the balancing test
allows the trial court to exclude this relevant information “if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”100 In the case of
using the FDPA to exclude aggravating evidence from the sentencing
hearing, the balancing test differs from that used by the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, which only
excludes evidence with probative value if the scales tip substantially in
favor of danger of unfair prejudice, the FDPA will exclude evidence if
the balance is only slightly in favor of danger of unfair prejudice.101
B. Supreme Court Limitations on Supervisory Powers and Patriarca
Since 1957, the Court has recognized the need for appellate courts

95. See United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding relevant hearsay
evidence to be admissible during a sentencing proceeding and meeting constitutional due process
requirements if it is shown to have a “minimal indicia of reliability,” even if such evidence would
be inadmissible under rules of evidence or the Confrontation Clause).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(3).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
100. Id.
101. See United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (interpreting § 3593(c) of
the FDPA to determine whether aggravating evidence with probative value was impermissibly
introduced in the penalty phase).
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to have supervisory authority over district court procedures.102 Such
supervisory rules that apply to federal district courts need not have
been mandated by the Constitution or a statute.103 Instead, the Court
has held that supervisory rules need only stem from a “reasoned
exercise of the courts’ authority”104 and be consistent with existing
statutes and the Constitution.105
The Court has found supervisory rules directed to jury selection
particularly important in cases where there is a high risk of racial bias
among potential jurors.106 The Court has also recognized that a
potential for juror bias exists in cases where there has been a high
likelihood that jurors were exposed to “vivid, unforgettable
information” through pretrial media reports and publicity.107 In such
high-profile cases, the Court has noted that asking potential jurors
questions about the specific content of news reports and publicity they
have seen or heard may be beneficial in preventing prejudicial jurors
from being seated, even though such questions are not constitutionally
required.108
When Patriarca was decided several decades ago, the First Circuit
used its supervisory authority to set procedural rules for trial courts to
follow when conducting voir dire in cases with extensive pretrial,
prejudicial publicity.109 In Patriarca, the defendants were accused of
several serious crimes stemming from their involvement in the New

102. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259–60 (1957) (“We believe that
supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration of the federal system.”).
103. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). See also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,
424 (1991) (noting that courts of appeals have broader supervisory authority to make rules for
federal trial courts to follow during voir dire than they do when determining what voir dire
procedures are constitutionally required under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus must be
followed by state trial courts).
104. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993).
105. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985).
106. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(noting that, where a reasonable possibility for bias against the defendant’s race or ethnicity exists,
a supervisory rule can require trial courts to ask potential jurors about racial or ethnic prejudices,
if requested by the defendant).
107. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 384 (2010).
108. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425 (1991). But see , 561 U.S. 358 at 447 (Sotomayor,
J,, concurring in part an dissenting in part) (emphasizing that trial courts still have broad
discretion in conducting voir dire, especially in the realm of pretrial publicity).
109. See Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 318 (1st Cir. 1968) (requiring trial courts to
determine the “kind and degree of [jurors’] exposure to the case [and] the effect of such exposure
on [their] present state of mind” in cases where there is a high likelihood that jurors have seen or
heard prejudicial pretrial information).
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England Mafia.110 Widespread media attention in the New England
area resulted, which was primarily directed toward the defendants’
involvement in the Mafia and the attempted killing of an attorney who
was counsel for the prosecution’s chief witness.111 Consequently,
counsel for the defendants filed multiple motions for a change in venue,
but all were denied by the trial court.112 On appeal, the First Circuit
upheld the rulings, finding that the court did not abuse its discretion,
partly because voir dire would have provided a safeguard to allow
counsel to mitigate possible effects of pretrial publicity.113 In reaching
this conclusion, however, the court took issue with the generic question
asked of jurors by the trial judge to determine whether they had
prejudicial views.114 Consequently, it decided that, in future cases, where
a significant likelihood of exposure to prejudicial information existed
and upon counsel’s request, the trial court should ask jurors questions
to determine “the kind and degree of [their] exposure to the case or
the parties, the effect of such exposure on his present state of mind, and
the extent to which such state of mind is immutable or subject to
change from evidence.”115
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Respondent’s Arguments
Dzhokhar’s argument that the Court of Appeals correctly vacated
his capital sentences is divided into two independent points.116 First, the
defense argues that the trial court’s erroneous decision to exclude
evidence of the Waltham murders violated the Eighth Amendment and
several provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA). This
exclusion left the jury with an incomplete picture of the relationship
between Dzhokhar and Tamerlan, catastrophically damaging the
mitigation theory. Second, the defense argues Patriarca represents a
valid exercise of the First Circuit’s supervisory authority and sets forth
110. Id. at 315–16.
111. Id. at 316.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 317.
114. See id. at 318 (ruling that the trial court did not err by failing to inquire further, but
noting the deficiency in a case of high publicity when a trial court judge merely asks whether
“‘there is any member of the jury . . . who feels that he would not be able to give the defendant[]
a fair and impartial trial.’”).
115. Id.
116. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 11.
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a mandatory rule requiring trial judges conducting voir dire to ask
potential jurors content-specific questions about the pretrial publicity
they have seen when there is a high risk of bias.117 The trial court
violated this supervisory rule by refusing to ask potential jurors about
what they had seen or heard in the media, which could have resulted in
the selection of jurors who were deeply biased given the extensive,
inflammatory publicity that followed the bombings.118
1. Violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death
Penalty Act (FDPA)
Dzhokhar’s counsel makes several arguments alleging that the trial
court violated his Eighth Amendment constitutional rights codified in
the FDPA. The Supreme Court has long held that the Eighth
Amendment allows a defendant facing capital punishment to present
to jurors any mitigating factors pertaining to his or her character,
record, or role in the crime that would provide support for a sentence
less than death.119 The Court has recognized a corollary of this
constitutional right, which requires sentencers to consider “any
relevant mitigating evidence.”120 The defense points out that a capital
defendant also has a constitutional right to argue that he was the less
culpable actor when others were involved in committing the crime.121
Finally, Dzhokhar’s counsel emphasizes that the bar for what can be
admitted as mitigating evidence is low.122 Standard evidentiary rules do
not apply and the evidence need only have “hallmarks of reliability”123
and “tend to logically prove or disprove some fact or circumstance.”124
Dzhokhar’s counsel relies on the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA),
which has implemented these constitutional requirements, as
determined by the Court’s common-law, into several statutory
provisions.125 Importantly, although the FDPA gives some discretion to
trial courts to exclude mitigating evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by other considerations,126 Dzhokhar’s counsel emphasizes
that this provision does not allow the trial court to minimize a
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. (citing Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)).
Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 15 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604).
Id. at 16 (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004)).
Id. at 16 (citing Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97(1979)).
Id. at 15 (quoting Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284–285)
Id. at 16 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)).
18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
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defendant’s constitutional rights by refusing to admit relevant
mitigating evidence that need only be minimally reliable.127
The defense first argues that evidence of Tamerlan’s involvement
in the Waltham murders was highly probative.128 Dzhokhar’s counsel
explains that his mitigation theory during the penalty phase was
completely premised on jurors understanding the influence placed on
him by his older brother and their relative culpabilities in carrying out
the bombing.129 The trial court allowed the defense to present only very
minor facts in an effort to show Tamerlan’s true personality and the
corrosive influence that he had on his younger brother.130 As the
defense points out, however, the Government used these factors and
the absence of evidence from the Waltham murders against Dzhokhar,
misleading the jury to believe that Tamerlan was “merely bossy” and
that the brothers were equals when it came to carrying out the
bombing.131 Highlighting his inability to introduce evidence of
Tamerlan’s true violent nature and his powerful ability to radicalize
Dzhokhar through his alleged prior commission of jihad, the defense
emphasizes that the jury had only a small and minor picture of
Tamerlan’s behavior.132 The defense further explains the relevance of
Tamerlan’s potential involvement in the murders, arguing that
commission of that crime, with evidence pointing to its jihadist roots,
coupled with the government’s own affidavit recounting Tamerlan’s
leadership role, could have allowed jurors to conclude that Dzhokhar
was less culpable in the bombings.133
Second, the defense explains why evidence of Tamerlan’s
involvement in the Waltham murders was at least reliable enough to be
presented to the jury.134 First, the defense reemphasizes that the bar for
admissibility of evidence at a sentencing hearing is low.135 Evidence
need only be minimally reliable.136 Dzhokhar’s counsel points out that
the government itself used Todashev’s confession to obtain a search
127. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 16.
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 18 (allowing the defense to present evidence that Tamerlan once poked
someone during an argument and occasionally yelled at people).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 24.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 27.
136. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2007).
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warrant, which required swearing that probable cause existed to
believe Tamerlan had committed the Waltham murders.137 If the
Government had sufficient evidence to independently conclude that
they had probable cause to obtain a sworn warrant affidavit, the
defense reasons the evidence must have been reliable enough to
present to a jury as part of a mitigation theory during sentencing.138
Dzhokhar’s counsel emphasizes that the government often presents
evidence of untried and uncharged crimes during the sentencing phase
in support of their aggravation theory.139 If such evidence can be
admitted by the government as an aggravating factor, regardless of how
admissible it would be under standard rules of evidence, it follows that
the same evidence should be admissible to support a defendant’s
mitigation theory.140
Third, the defense concludes that exclusion of the evidence was a
violation of both the Eighth Amendment and the FDPA.141 Dzhokhar’s
counsel admits that the trial court had discretion to determine the
manner in which the evidence was presented to prevent jury confusion.
But Respondent’s counsel argues that the Constitution does not allow
the court to altogether exclude relevant and reliable evidence solely
because it may have been confusing or, as the Government alleges, a
“waste of time.”142 The defense also emphasizes that evidence being
contested does not in itself make the evidence confusing or
unreliable.143 Dzhokhar’s counsel points to several cases where the
government was allowed to present complex, time-consuming evidence
to provide support for aggravation theories, and reasons that, if the
Eighth Amendment allowed such evidence to support aggravation, it
similarly must allow defendants to admit comparable evidence in
support of their mitigation theories. For similar reasons, because the
trial court incorrectly found that the Waltham evidence had no
probative value, Dzhokhar’s counsel adduces that exclusion of it
violated the FDPA by preventing the presentation of relevant
information.144 In reaching this conclusion, the defense reasons that the
trial court did not perform the balancing test required by Section

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
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3593(c), which weighs the probative value of the evidence against the
court’s reason for excluding it. If the trial court had performed the test,
the defense argues that its reasons for exclusion could not have possibly
outweighed its probative value, leading to violation of Dzhokhar’s
Eigth Amendment guarantees codified in the FDPA.
Finally, the defense argues that the trial court’s error was not
harmless. The Government cannot be nearly certain, as the Court
requires,145 that the jury would have reached a unanimous verdict to
recommend the death penalty if the Waltham evidence had been
permitted, preventing the trial court’s error from being harmless.146 In
reaching this conclusion, the defense points to the lack of presentation
of the Waltham evidence as a missing puzzle piece which would allow
jurors to conclude that he had been radicalized because of Tamerlan’s
influence.147 The defense also references the fact that Dzhokhar’s
knowledge of Tamerlan’s involvement in the murders, along with his
young age and culture that encouraged respecting older siblings, would
have additionally pressured him to follow in Tamerlan’s footsteps.148
Thus, because of the misleading picture portrayed to jurors, along with
the fact that the jurors only recommended death for the charges they
were led to believe the Respondent had performed without Tamerlan’s
pressure,149 the Respondent reasons that at least one juror could have
voted for life in prison without the possibility of parole.150
2. Violation of the First Circuit’s Valid Supervisory Rule in
Patriarca
The Court has long allowed appellate courts to create “desirable”
rules of procedure for district courts to follow.151 These rules need only

145. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 15 (1994).
146. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 33.
147. See id. at 34 (referencing other factors that supported the Respondent’s theory that
Tamerlan had influenced his radicalized beliefs and behavior but finding that, without more
concrete evidence that could have been provided by the Waltham murders, the jurors were led to
believe that the Respondent had radicalized without Tamerlan’s pressure).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 35–36 (finding that the jurors only recommended death for actions Dzhokhar
performed when Tamerlan was not physically present). Such recommendation would support the
inference that the government cannot be virtually certain that the jury would have unanimously
voted to recommend death if the defense counsel had been allowed to show evidence that
Tamerlan’s influence extended beyond his mere physical presence to create coercive mental
pressure on Dzhokhar to commit the acts.
150. Id. at 36.
151. Id. at 39.
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be created within the authority of the court152 and not “conflict with
constitutional or statutory provisions.”153 Thus, the defense argues that,
because the supervisory rule promulgated by the First Circuit in
Patriarca is reasonable and ensures that an unbiased jury is selected
through voir dire, it should be followed.154
Dzhokhar’s counsel begins by pointing to instances where the
Court was concerned about biased jurors and used supervisory
authority instead of constitutional rules to afford greater protections in
securing an impartial jury.155 The defense compares the First Circuit’s
exercise of supervisory authority in Patriarca to this line of precedent,
emphasizing that a biased jury can result from their exposure to pretrial
publicity.156 The defense then reconciles the supervisory rule in
Patriarca with the holding in Mu’Min v. Virginia.157 Mu’Min held that a
trial court was not constitutionally required to ask jurors about the
specific content they had viewed about the case before the trial.158
Nevertheless, nothing in Mu’Min directly prohibited courts of appeals
from setting supervisory rules for voir dire that required content
questioning of potential jurors.159 In fact, Dzhokhar’s counsel points out
that the Court in Mu’Min unanimously agreed that content questioning
could be helpful, and that several trial courts have implemented similar
lines of questioning in high-profile cases to assess potential juror bias.160
The defense next evaluates the wide range of media that was
disseminated before the trial.161 Such publicity included racial slurs and
community leaders calling for the death penalty as well as claims about
Dzhokhar’s immigration status.162 The defense argues that such
statements were of such an inflammatory character that the Eighth
Amendment would have made them impermissible.163 Many of these
statements were made on the Internet and social media, preventing the
trial court judge from understanding fully the type of publicity jurors
152. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993).
153. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985).
154. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 40.
155. See id. at 41 (pointing to the Court’s desire to prevent a racially-biased jury and using its
supervisory authority to require racial-bias questioning of potential jurors under certain
circumstances, even though such a line of questioning was not constitutionally required).
156. Id. at 41–42.
157. 500 U.S. 415 (1991)
158. Id. at 416.
159. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 43.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 44.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 44–45.
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had seen.164 Further, Bostonians were united by the publicity, leading to
feelings of a shared obligation to obtain justice for the victims.165 Thus,
the defense argues the effects of the inflammatory statements were
worsened, resulting in a heightened need for a rule that would allow
the trial court to determine exactly what jurors saw.166
Finally, Dzhokhar’s counsel addresses the Government’s
counterarguments. First, they dismiss the Government’s contention
that a supervisory rule can only be promulgated if it is constitutionally
required. In support of their argument, Dzhokhar’s counsel points to
the Court’s decision in Rosales-Lopez v. United States,167 which found
that supervisory rules directed to voir dire do not need to be
constitutionally required to be promulgated.168 Second, Dzhokhar’s
counsel emphasizes that, although the Court has granted trial courts
wide discretion in conducting voir dire, such discretion has also been
limited to ensure trial judges have sufficient information on the
potential jurors before making any final decisions.169 Such limitations
are necessary to ensure jurors seated are truly impartial.170 Last, the
Respondent asserts the Petitioner has mischaracterized the Patriarca
rule as inflexible, since it only requires content-based questioning if the
trial court believes there is a high risk of pretrial publicity.171
Accordingly, the Respondent concludes that Patriarca is an entirely
valid supervisory rule that was directed violated. Such violation
resulted when, in a case with such a wide range of inflammatory pretrial
publicity, the Respondent requested content questioning, but the court
refused to ask jurors exactly what they had seen or remembered about
the case.172 The Respondent stresses that merely asking how much of
the publicity jurors had seen was not sufficient, because a juror could
have deep emotional feelings about a particular piece from the media
while still having only seen a small amount of publicity in total.173

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 47.
451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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B. Petitioner’s Arguments
As the Petitioner, the Government argues that the First Circuit
erred in overturning Dzhokhar’s capital sentences. The argument is
divided into two main points, both of which are largely critical of the
lack of deference given by the First Circuit to the trial court’s
discretionary judgment.174 First, on the issue of pretrial publicity, the
Government points to the extensiveness of the voir dire undertaken by
the trial court. The Government maintains that the First Circuit’s strict
application of the rule from Patriarca is constitutionally unnecessary
and contrary to Supreme Court precedent requiring deferential review
of voir dire.175 Second, the Government uses the FDPA to argue that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow
Dzhokhar’s counsel to admit the Waltham evidence.176 Instead, the
Government contends that the First Circuit owed more deference to
the district court’s decision to exclude such evidence from the penalty
phase.177
1. Limiting the Application of Patriarca
First, the Government’s argument emphasizes the need to respect
and trust the judgment of the trial court in narrowing the pool of
potential jurors during voir dire.178 The Government stresses that the
Court has never required jurors to be completely devoid of any
knowledge of the case, but rather that the key is to select jurors who
can remain impartial, even if they have seen publicity.179 The
Government points to Skilling v. United States,180 a case where the
Court held that narrowing the jury pool to eliminate impartial jurors is
specifically a responsibility given to the trial court judge.181 The
Government implies that this rule is not without good reason, since trial
judges have an opportunity to assess jurors in the moment to determine
their impartiality and often sit in the region impacted by the publicity,
allowing them a firsthand insight into how jurors may have been
affected.182 Additionally, if “extraordinary local prejudice” were such

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 9, at 14–15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 17.
561 U.S. 358, 384 (2010).
Id. at 386.
Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 9, at 18–19.
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an issue, the Government contends that the Court of Appeals would
not have found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
finding the venue in Boston to be proper.183
The Government next emphasizes the extensive process
undertaken by the trial court to determine the impartiality of potential
jurors.184 The Government points to the detailed questionnaire initially
given to all prospective jurors.185 It insists that jurors were asked
whether they had formed an opinion from their exposure to the
publicity as to Dzhokhar’s guilt and the application of the death
penalty.186 Any jurors who were called back for the individual voir dire,
which lasted several weeks, were asked to elaborate on their answer to
this question.187 The Government contends that many potential jurors
were excused if they indicated they could not set aside any personal
biases or prior views after this process.188 The broad deference
advocated for in Skilling would not find this situation to call for a
searching inquiry by the appellate court to second-guess the deference
afforded to the trial court in determining the impartiality of jurors.189
Third, the Government argues that the only reason the Court of
Appeals invalidated the capital sentences due to the voir dire was
because of a decades-old decision, Patriarca.190 The Government
alleges that the First Circuit read Patriarca as setting forth a strict,
inflexible rule, requiring all district courts to ask every prospective
juror about the content of the publicity they had seen or heard, any
time any party requested such an inquiry.191 The Government, however,
argues that making the application of this rule mandatory was
unexpected, because nothing would have led the trial court to believe
that its extensive voir dire did not meet the standard.192 The
Government points out that the generic question asked of alreadyseated jurors in Patriarca did not compare to the detailed questions
asked of the prospective jurors in this case, and that the First Circuit
had only used Patriarca to reaffirm the broad discretion given to trial
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
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courts during voir dire.
Finally, the Government emphasizes that Skilling rejected
formulaic, categorical rules to determine the sufficiency of voir dire,
and that the Court determined in Mu’Min that content-specific
inquiries about the specific publicity seen or heard by jurors were not
constitutionally required.193 The Government hypothesizes that such an
inflexible rule would not be practical or useful in every case.194 It points
to the holding in United States v. Hasting,195 which requires supervisory
powers used to reverse a conviction to be balanced against both the
interests of any victims and any practical issues stemming from retrying
the issues long after the events occurred.196
2. The Federal Death Penalty Act Permits Trial Court Discretion
In arguing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding evidence of Tamerlan’s role in the Waltham murders, the
Government relies on the FDPA. First, the Government points out that
18 U.S.C. §3593(c) grants some discretion to trial courts to exclude
evidence if they decide its “probative value” would be outweighed by
other considerations, such as its potential to confuse the jury.197 The
Government maintains that this section supports the theory that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion, because the jury was not
required to take part in a side trial to determine Tamerlan’s role in the
Waltham murders.198 The Government argues that asking the jury to
sidetrack to untangle the respective roles of Tamerlan and Todashev in
the Waltham murders would take a significant amount of time and
resources because both were deceased.199 The Government points out
that, even if Tamerlan were the lead perpetrator, the Waltham murders
were a separate crime, allegedly committed in the spur of the moment.
Thus, the Government concludes that the murders were only very
loosely tied to an organized terrorist attack and could not show his
ability to influence Dzhokhar to commit the marathon bombings and
the crimes that followed.200

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
461 U.S. 499 (1983).
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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Second, the Government points to 18 U.S.C. §3595(c)(2)201 and
argues that excluding evidence of the Waltham murders was harmless,
regardless of the discretion exercised by the trial court.202 The
Government contends that the evidence unambiguously demonstrates
Dzhokhar’s independent commitment to jihad through his actions
taken without Tamerlan’s presence, and that one can reasonably
assume that the jury would have recommended the death penalty even
if evidence of the Waltham murders were presented.203
V. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act
First and foremost, the Court should determine whether the “highly
probative” balancing test found in the FDPA under Section 3593(c)
applies to the trial court’s discretion to exclude information that would
support mitigating factors. If the test does apply to the trial court’s
discretion to exclude information that would support both mitigating
and aggravating factors, the Court should determine whether such an
application is in accordance with the Eighth Amendment.
In Respondent’s brief, counsel briefly argues that the Eighth
Amendment prevents the court from excluding any “relevant, reliable
evidence,” implying that the balancing test is only able to exclude
“inflammatory aggravating evidence.”204 During oral arguments, Justice
Barrett asked counsel to expand on this point, and counsel
reemphasized that the Eighth Amendment requires that any relevant
and reliable evidence supporting a mitigation factor must be admitted,
unless extraordinary circumstances apply.205 Justice Sotomayor then
added that the balancing test cannot be merely a “fifty-fifty” balancing
test if and when it applies to information directed to mitigation.206

201. “The Court of Appeals shall not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any
error which can be harmless. . .where the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error was harmless.”
202. Petitioner’s Writ of Cert., supra note 9, at 29.
203. Id. at 30.
204. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 17 n.2.
205. Oral Argument at 1:02:53, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (argued Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?514693-1/justices-hear-case-boston-marathon-bombers-deathsentence.
206. Oral Argument at 1:15:40, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (argued Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?514693-1/justices-hear-case-boston-marathon-bombers-deathsentence.
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Instead, she hypothesized that Eighth Amendment guarantees
generally prevent the balancing test from being used to exclude
relevant and reliable mitigating evidence.207 Accordingly, the standard
for excluding evidence under the balancing test as applied to mitigating
evidence must differ from the “fifty-fifty” standard used by the
balancing test to exclude aggravating evidence.208
“Where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems.”209 In the case of the “highly probative”
balancing test found in § 3593(c), the Court should construe the
provision to only allow application of the test to exclude aggravating
factors. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the Eighth
Amendment’s treatment toward mitigating evidence, which courts
have long held guarantees a capital defendant the right to present “any
relevant mitigating evidence”210 if such evidence is shown to have a
“minimal indicia of reliability.”211 Applying the “highly probative” test
to mitigating evidence would give trial courts a constitutionally
unacceptable range of discretion to prohibit mitigating evidence,
because the constitutional standards of relevancy and reliability could
be met but the evidence would still be excluded.
The constitutional rationale for excluding application of the “highly
probative” test to mitigating evidence is demonstrated in this case. The
government admitted that evidence from the Waltham murders was at
least reliable enough to provide probable cause to obtain a search
warrant.212 Additionally, “any . . . of the circumstances of the offense”213
can be considered relevant. Thus, a circumstance of the bombings
depends on whether a teenager living in a hierarchical culture was
influenced to commit a heinous crime because of his older adult
brother’s prior commission of jihad. This circumstance could logically
and reasonably lead a juror to believe a sentence less than death is
warranted, which is all that is required for mitigating evidence to be
considered relevant.214

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (relying upon the statutory canon of construction of constitutional avoidance).
210. Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007).
211. United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2007).
212. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 9.
213. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
214. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–85 (2004).
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In sum, and as Dzhokhar’s counsel alludes to during oral
arguments,215 application of the balancing test to determine whether
the mitigating evidence has a “highly probative value”216 introduces a
new requirement for mitigating evidence that is not contemplated by
Eighth Amendment case law. Through application of this test, the
evidence must not only logically and reasonably allow a juror to
determine that a sentence less than death is warranted.217 Instead,
determining whether the evidence has a “highly probative value”
allows the trial court to determine whether mitigating evidence has
some additional value that outweighs minor logistical issues that could
arise during the presentation of the evidence. Creation of a new
requirement without thoroughly evaluating the consequences is
problematic. Such a broad degree of deference granted to a trial court
judge prevents a defendant facing the most severe punishment
available in the United States from being fully protected by Eighth
Amendment guarantees.
B. Public Policy Considerations
In reaching a decision, the Court should also consider the political
upheaval that recently occurred following the change in
administrations. In July of 2021, newly appointed United States
Attorney General Merrick Garland placed a moratorium on federal
executions to allow for review of execution policies and protocols.218
This moratorium came after the Trump administration ended a
seventeen year pause on executions, which resulted in the killing of
thirteen people over a period of seven months.219 The Attorney General
215. See Oral Argument at 1:22:36, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (argued Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?514693-1/justices-hear-case-boston-marathon-bombers-deathsentence (arguing that the Eighth Amendment imposes a constraint on how the balancing test
under § 3593(c) can be interpreted). Later, however, Justice Gorsuch questions as to whether
Dhokhar’s counsel argued the unconstitutionality of the FDPA in the courts below. See Oral
Argument at 1:23:07, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (argued Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.cspan.org/video/?514693-1/justices-hear-case-boston-marathon-bombers-death-sentence.
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).
217. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284–285.
218. Memorandum from Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus. on the Moratorium
on Federal Executions Pending Review of Policies and Procedures to the Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t
of
Jus.
1
(Jul.
1,
2021)
(on
file
with
author),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1408636/download.
219. Keri Blakinger, How Biden Can Reverse Trump’s Death Penalty Expansion, THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Mar.
12,
2021,
6:00
A.M.),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2021/03/12/how-biden-can-reverse-trump-s-death-penaltyexpansion.
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was particularly concerned with the constitutionality of using
pentobarbital to induce death, given research by medical experts
finding that painful reactions could occur. During oral arguments,
Justice Barrett questioned the Government’s rationale of reinstituting
the death penalty for the Respondent, given that he would be placed
on death row for an unknown period of time until presumptively the
moratorium is lifted.220 Justice Barrett touches on an important
question: how much should the Court adapt its opinion on a case to a
change in policy promulgated by the executive branch, particularly
when the policy at issue has the possibility of remaining in place for an
uncertain length of time?
In considering this question, the Court should turn to the
constitutionality of subjecting capital defendants to the possibility of
death for an unknown time period, which could range from months to
an indefinite number of years. The Court has not yet considered how
long a death row inmate can be on death row before being executed.221
Research shows, however, that prolonged stays on death row without a
set execution date can lead to severe psychological harms, known
informally as “death row syndrome.”222 Many of these resulting harms
are similar to those inflicted on terminally ill patients which lead to
suicidal thoughts.223 Thus, the Court should intervene and consider
whether the infliction of such potential psychological harms by the
federal government is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
This consideration is particularly critical here, because reversal of the
First Circuit’s decision would equate to the Court subjecting a capital
defendant to only a potential death sentence, having full knowledge
that a federal moratorium on the death penalty would prevent him
from receiving an execution date for an unknown period of time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should ensure procedural safeguards remain
intact in capital trials and affirm the decision of the First Circuit. In
reaching this decision, the Supreme Court should decide that the trial
220. Oral Argument at 53:19, U.S. v. Tsarnaev, No. 20-443 (argued Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?514693-1/justices-hear-case-boston-marathon-bombers-deathsentence.
PEANLTY
INFORMATION
CTR.,
221. Time
on
Death
Row,
DEATH
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/death-row-time-on-death-row.
222. Amy Smith, Note, Not “Waiving” But Drowning: The Anatomy of
Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 244–45 (2008).
223. Id. at 251.
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court’s exercise of discretion in using the “highly probative” balancing
test was unconstitutional as applied to the exclusion of relevant and
reliable mitigating evidence. Accordingly, the Court should clarify the
interpretation of the Federal Death Penalty Act, construing it to
comply with a capital defendant’s Eighth Amendment guarantees.
Such an interpretation would allow the Court to reach a conclusion in
line with current public policy, which is critical given the temporal
uncertainty of the federal moratorium.

